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Against Motivational Efficacy of Beliefs 
 
Abstract 
Bromwich (2010) argues that a belief is motivationally efficacious in that, other things being 
equal, it disposes an agent to answer a question in accordance with that belief. I reply that 
what we are disposed to do is largely determined by our genes, whereas what we believe is 
largely determined by stimuli from the environment. We have a standing and default 
disposition to answer questions honestly, ceteris paribus, even before we are exposed to 
environmental stimuli. Since this standing and default disposition is innate, and our beliefs 
have their source in environmental stimuli, our beliefs cannot be the source of the disposition. 
Moreover, a recent finding in neuroscience suggests that motivation is extrinsic to belief.  
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1. Introduction 
In folk psychology, a belief and a desire are often jointly used to explain human behavior. For 
example, I am drinking water because I believe that drinking water quenches thirst, and 
because I have the desire to quench my thirst. A belief is a cognitive state that represents a 
state of affairs in the world. It is capable of being true or false. In contrast, a desire is a 
conative state that motivates an action. It is incapable of being true or false. Danielle 
Bromwich (2010) advances a novel thesis that all beliefs, moral or non-moral, are capable of 
motivating actions as well as representing facts:  
 
I then argue that we have good reason to think that all beliefs can motivate a particular action  
without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. (Bromwich, 2010: 344) 
 
Bromwich’s theory of belief clashes head-on with Michael Smith’s theory of belief (1994). 
Smith claims that a belief alone does not motivate an action and that both a belief and a desire 
are required to explain an action. The aim of this paper is to refute Bromwich’s arguments for 
the view that a belief is motivationally efficacious and to defend the Humean view that a 
belief is motivationally inert. I will show that a belief does not have a dispositional property.  
 
2. Bromwich vs. the Humean 
Let me begin with Bromwich’s example, which is useful in exhibiting the differences 
between her theory of belief and the Humean theory of belief:  
 
Consider David. He believes that ‘The knives and forks are on the table’ and so when Carole 
asks him ‘Are the knives and forks on the table?’ he replies ‘Yes’. Now imagine that David has 
this belief, is asked the same question by Carole, but does not answer at all. Can we make sense 
of David having the belief in question? Only, I think, in a situation where things are not 
otherwise equal. David may want, for instance, to give Carole the ‘silent treatment’. His belief 
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disposes him to answer ‘Yes’ but this disposition is defeated by a competing disposition arising 
from his desire. But, if all things are equal, and Carole asks him ‘Are the knives and forks on the 
table?’ what could prevent David from answering this question in the affirmative? (2010: 351) 
 
David says yes to Carole’s question “Are the knives and forks on the table?” Why does he 
say so? Bromwich and the Humean have different explanations. On Bromwich’s account, 
David says so, because he believes that the knives and forks are on the table, and “the belief 
alone explains the action” (2010: 352). The desire to say so need not be invoked to explain 
why he says so because the belief is motivationally efficacious enough to produce the action 
of answering the question affirmatively. Thus, Bromwich’s theory of belief can be 
summarized by what she calls the minimal thesis: 
 
The minimal thesis: A subject S believes that p only if, if S were asked if it is the case that p, S 
would respond in the affirmative, all other things being equal. (Bromwich, 2010: 351) 
 
If a subject believes that p, then, ceteris paribus, he would say yes to the question: Is it the 
case that p? If he does not say so, it is hard to attribute to him the belief that p. A belief is 
motivationally efficacious in the sense that it disposes an agent to answer a question in 
accordance with it. 
On the Humean account, in contrast, David says yes to Carole’s question, because he 
believes that the knives and forks are on the table and because he desires to say so. The belief 
is motivationally inert, so it alone cannot bring about the action of answering the question. 
The belief needs a motivational backup from the desire to answer honestly. The Humean can 
add that the desire to answer honestly is a standing desire, i.e., it is a desire that we always 
have. Also, it is a default desire, i.e., if there is no special reason not to be truthful in a 
particular situation, we have the desire to answer honestly. This default desire is independent 
of a belief.  
Suppose that David does not answer Carole’s question when he believes that the knives 
and forks are on the table. Why doesn’t he answer her question? Again, Bromwich and the 
Humean have competing explanations:  
 
The Humean argues that although David has the belief in question, David also has a desire that 
directs him not to answer the question in the affirmative; a desire, say, to give Carole the ‘silent 
treatment’. The minimal theorist can agree—but, the minimal theorist will argue, David’s belief 
still disposes him to answer the question in the affirmative; David just fails to act on this 
disposition because it is defeated by the desire. (Bromwich, 2010: 352)  
 
According to Bromwich, David believes that the knives and forks are on the table, so he is 
disposed to answer Carole’s question in the affirmative. But he does not answer it because his 
disposition is defeated by another mental state. Perhaps, he harbors anger toward her. In his 
mind, there was a conflict between the belief and the anger, and the anger vanquished the 
belief. As a result, he does not answer her question.  
According to the Humean, on the other hand, a belief is motivationally inert, so 
David’s belief cannot dispose him to answer Carole’s question affirmatively. He instead has 
the standing desire to respond honestly to questions from others. But the default desire is 
overridden by his anger toward her. As a result, he does not answer her question. Both his 
default desire and his anger toward her are independent of his belief that the knives and the 
forks are on the table. The belief, since it lacks motivational force, did not participate in the 
battle between the standing desire and the anger.  
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As sketched above, Bromwich and the Humean have competing explanations as to why 
David answers or fails to answer Carole’s question. As Bromwich notes herself, she and the 
Humean have different burdens of proof:  
 
The Humean needs to show that David’s affirmative answer is motivated by a conceptually 
independent desire that is neither entailed by the presence of, nor partially constitutive of, any 
belief. (Bromwich, 2010: 354) 
 
In contrast, Bromwich needs to show that David’s act of answering affirmatively is motivated 
by the disposition inherent in his belief, not by another mental state external to the belief. In 
the following sections, I will criticize Bromwich’s position and defend the Humean position.  
 
3. No Necessary Connection 
Smith (1994), a proponent of the Humean theory of motivation, argues that motivation is not 
constitutive of belief because in certain circumstances, motivation is obliterated while belief 
remains unscathed. For example, depressions “can leave someone’s evaluative outlook intact 
while removing their motivations altogether” (Smith, 1994: 120-121). Thus, if an agent is 
motivated to do anything at all when he believes something, his motivation stemmed not 
from his belief but from some other source. 
Bromwich replies that Smith’s contention is at variance with scientific literature on 
clinical depression according to which depression impairs not only motivation but also belief:  
 
Many studies reveal that depressives are cognitively impaired: their depressive episodes are 
accompanied by irrational thoughts and a tendency to perceive themselves, their surrounding 
and their future in an unwarrantedly negative light. (Bromwich, 2010: 348)  
 
Psychological studies suggest that motivational impairment is necessarily accompanied by 
cognitive impairment. It is impossible to remove motivation without destroying belief. 
Therefore, motivation is constitutive of belief. 
In my view, the scientific literature Bromwich cites does not establish that motivation is 
an essential ingredient of belief. In order for motivation to be constitutive of belief, 
motivation and belief should not be separated in all possible worlds. What the scientific 
finding displays is at best that they cannot be pulled apart in the nearby possible worlds 
where objects abide by the laws of nature. Motivation is not constitutive of belief as long as 
they come apart in a remote possible world where the laws of nature break down. In other 
words, it is metaphysical necessity, not nomological necessity, which is required to refute 
Smith’s contention that motivation is not constitutive of belief. The scientific literature 
exhibits at best the nomologically necessary connection between motivation and belief.  
Moreover, Smith’s contention can be bolstered by a different example. Imagine that 
David becomes lethargic as a result of smoking a potent form of marijuana over a long period 
of time. He does not take a walk even on a beautiful day, always staying in his apartment 
alone. He does not even want to speak with anyone. One day, Carol visits his apartment and 
puts knives and forks on the table. At that moment, David’s visual faculty works flawlessly. 
Accordingly, he believes that the knives and forks are on the table. Carol asks whether the 
knives and forks are on the table. Silence ensues. In this situation, David does not answer her 
question not because another motivation obstructed the motivation to respond but because he 
does not have the motivation to answer her question in the first place. Recall that being 
lethargic, he does not even want to speak with anyone. It does not matter whether the laws of 
nature allow such an agent to exist or not in this world. What is important is that we can 
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conceive of such an agent, and as long as such an agent exists in a remote possible world, 
Smith’s point is established that motivation is not constitutive of belief.  
Interestingly, recent research in neuroscience suggests that there is not even a 
nomologically necessary connection between belief and motivation. Some neuroscientists 
recently discovered that a neural system in a rat’s brain is responsible for selecting a single 
action from multiple alternatives. Signals arise in a region of the rat’s brain called the rostral 
AGm, when the rat makes a decision on what action to choose among multiple alternatives 
associated with different values:  
 
Our results indicate the involvement of the rostral AGm not only in action selection but also in 
valuation, which is consistent with the finding that AGm activity is modulated by expected 
reward. (Jung Hoon Sul et al., 2011: 6) 
 
Their research on the rat’s brain suggests that there might be a particular region of the human 
brain that is also responsible for the decision on what action to choose among different 
alternatives. For example, signals arise in that region of our brain when we decide to major in 
philosophy as opposed to English, but signals do not arise when we form the belief that a 
triangle is three-sided as opposed to two-sided. In short, it is likely that there is a neural 
difference between our decision on what to believe and our decision on what to do. 
The neural difference goes hand in hand with the Humean view that a belief is 
motivationally inert, but not with Bromwich’s view that a belief is motivationally efficacious. 
For the Humean, motivation is involved when we decide to do something, but not when we 
decide to believe something. Therefore, it is natural that neural signals pertaining to 
motivation arise when we decide to do something but not when we decide to believe 
something. For Bromwich, however, a belief is motivationally potent, so motivation is 
involved in both the decision on what to believe and the decision on what to do. Therefore, 
Bromwich’s position cannot explain why the neural difference exists.  
 
4. Against Weak Dispositionalism 
Bromwich’s position, the minimal thesis, originates from what she calls weak 
dispositionalism according to which a belief disposes an agent to act in a certain way. A 
successful defense of the Humean view that a belief is motivationally impotent requires the 
refutation of the argument for weak dispositionalism. In this section, I criticize the argument 
for weak dispositionalism, which Bromwich states as follows:  
 
Weak dispositionalism: All beliefs have dispositional properties. Weak dispositionalism is 
widely accepted due to the fact that it is hard to make sense of an agent believing that p but 
failing to act, think, feel or expect as if it is the case that p, at least when all other things are 
equal. (Bromwich, 2010: 349). 
 
The following accept weak dispositionalism: H. H. Price (1969), Willard V. O. Quine (1960), 
Gilbert Ryle (1949), R. B. Braithwaite (1932-1933), Ruth Barcan Marcus (1990), L. Jonathan 
Cohen (1992), Eric Schwitzgebel (2001, 2002), Robert Stalnaker (1984), Frank Ramsey (1931), 
Daniel Dennett (1978), Charles Travis (2003), Robert Audi (1994) and Lyn Rudder-Baker 
(1995). (Bromwich, 2010: 349, footnote) 
 
As her footnote above indicates, Bromwich is in good company. Many eminent philosophers 
are attracted to the idea that a belief alone has the power to motivate an action. They would 
endorse Bromwich’s minimal thesis for the reason that it is hard to account for an agent 
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believing that p but failing to act as if it is the case that p, ceteris paribus. 
From the Humean point of view, however, it is not hard to account for an agent who 
acts contrary to his belief. Such an action can be explained in terms of a special desire 
overriding the standing desire to act in accordance with one’s belief. For example, imagine 
that an agent believes that the earth is round. When asked whether the earth is round or flat, 
however, he says, “The earth is flat.” Why does he speak contrary to his belief? It might be 
that he is under a political pressure to speak as if he believes that the earth is flat, or that a 
million dollars is offered to him on the condition that he acts contrary to his belief. The desire 
to avoid the political persecution or the desire to earn the money overturned the standing 
desire to answer honestly. This Humean explanation undermines the argument for weak 
dispositionalism embraced by the many prominent philosophers above. 
 
5. Standing Desire 
Recall that the Humean posits the existence of the default desire to answer questions as we 
believe, and that the default desire is independent of any belief. Bromwich argues that the 
Humean assumption is illegitimate because it is not true of all human beings. It is implausible 
that three-year-old children have such a sophisticated desire: 
 
It seems implausible to assume that children have a standing desire to be cooperative 
conversational partners. Imagine chatting with a three year old. Perhaps you ask the child ‘Is 
that jam on your hands?’ and the child in question responds in the affirmative. Is it plausible to 
assume that this three year old has a standing desire to be a cooperative conversational partner 
or even a standing desire to play a cooperative conversational game? Clearly not—it is 
psychologically implausible to suppose that a three year old could have desires with such 
sophisticated content. And, notice, even if the content is simpler—say, a desire to be honest—it 
is not clear that very young children have yet fully grasped concepts such as honesty. It is far 
from clear, then, that we can attribute such standing desires to all human beings. (Bromwich, 
2010: 355) 
 
Note that for Bromwich, it is implausible that three-year-old children have the standing desire 
to be cooperative conversational partners or to be honest because it is not clear that they can 
have desires with such sophisticated content, and because it is not clear that they have 
grasped the concepts of being a cooperative conversational partner or of honesty.  
In my view, Bromwich’s argument that three-year-olds cannot have the desire to be 
honest because they have not yet grasped the concept of honesty is invalid. We can think 
without understanding what it is to think. Grasping the concept of thinking is not needed in 
order to think. Similarly, children can have a standing desire to answer honestly without 
understanding what it is to answer honestly. To put it another way, grasping the concept of 
honesty is not required in order to have the desire to answer honestly. In general, we do not 
need a second-order mental state in order to have a first-order mental state. After all, if we 
need the second-order mental state in order to have a first-order mental state, we would also 
need a third-order mental state in order to have the second-order mental state, and we would 
not even be able to have the first-order mental state due to the problem of infinite regress. In 
short, three-year-olds may not know what it is to be cooperative conversational partners. It 
does not follow, however, that they do not have the desire to be cooperative conversational 
partners. 
     How about Bromwich’s argument that three-year-olds cannot have the standing desire 
to be cooperative conversational partners because it is too sophisticated for them? An 
evolutionary consideration speaks against her argument. Some evolutionary psychologists 
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maintain that a sense of morality has evolved by natural selection. It was selected for in the 
past because it promoted cooperation between individuals, and because the cooperation 
increased the chance of propagating individuals’ genes:  
 
The constellation of thoughts and feelings that constitute a sense of morality evolved to enable 
individuals to uphold cooperative social relations that maximized their biological benefits. 
(Krebs, 2008: 168) 
 
The sense of cooperation is in our genes. It is a heritable characteristic that has been 
transmitted to us from our ancestors. Cooperation is hard to come by without the honest 
exchange of information between individuals. To exchange information honestly is to be a 
cooperative conversational partner. Therefore, it is plausible that three-year-olds have a 
sophisticated desire to be cooperative conversational partners, contra Bromwich. 
Suppose that Bromwich is right that three-year-olds cannot have the desire to be 
cooperative conversational partners because it is too sophisticated for them. Then, this 
criticism against the Humean theory of belief backfires on Bromwich’s own theory of belief. 
Recall that her minimal thesis holds that to believe that p involves to be disposed to answer 
affirmatively the question: Is it the case that p? The disposition to answer the question in that 
manner is more sophisticated than the desire to be cooperative conversational partners. 
Therefore, three-year-olds cannot believe, for example, that an apple is red.  
 
6. Cognitive Dissonance 
Bromwich claims that “the literature on cognitive dissonance gives us reason to favour the 
minimal thesis over the Humean theory of motivation” (2010: 360). Recall that the minimal 
thesis holds that if a subject believes that p, he would say yes ceteris paribus to the question: 
Is it the case that p? In order to evaluate her assertion, we need to know what psychologists 
say about cognitive dissonance. Festinger and Carlsmith, whom Bromwich cites, ask an 
interesting question: What will happen to “a person’s private opinion if he is forced to do or 
say something contrary to that opinion?” (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959: 203) Suppose, for 
example, that you performed a repetitive and tedious task. As a result, you believe that the 
task was boring and monotonous. But you are offered a certain amount of money and asked 
to say to others that the task was interesting. Consequently, you say to them that the task was 
enjoyable. You said something contrary to your belief. In such a situation, Festinger and 
Carlsmith note, you suffer from cognitive dissonance, a kind of psychological discomfort, 
and then replace your previous belief with a new belief that accords with what you said or did. 
Your new belief in the above case is that the task was really interesting. As a result, cognitive 
dissonance is resolved and cognitive consonance returns. 
Why does acting contrary to one’s belief cause cognitive dissonance? Bromwich’s 
explanation is that “acting contrary to one’s belief causes cognitive dissonance because to 
believe that p is to be disposed to act as if it is the case that p…” (2010: 360). The idea seems 
to be that cognitive dissonance originates from the conflict between what your belief disposes 
you to do and what you actually do. The clash between the belief and the action gives rise to 
the cognitive dissonance and then to the revision of the previous belief. You thereby form a 
new belief and regain cognitive consonance. Notice that for Bromwich, cognitive dissonance 
arises because of the conflict between the old belief and the action. 
     It seems to me, however, that the Humean has an alternative explanation of cognitive 
dissonance, and that it is at least as plausible as Bromwich’s. We have a standing desire to 
speak and act in accordance with our belief. Cognitive dissonance arises when there is a 
collision between the standing desire and a special desire that we have in a particular 
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situation. The special desire in the above case is the desire to make money in return for 
saying that the task was interesting. The clash between the standing desire and the special 
desire leads to the revision of the previous belief. When the belief is revised, cognitive 
consonance is restored. Note that the old belief is replaced with the new belief not because of 
the conflict between the old belief and the action but because of the conflict between the 
standing desire and the special desire. The standing desire and the special desire are both 
independent of the old belief and the new belief. Therefore, Festinger and Carlsmith’s 
cognitive dissonance theory in psychology does not favor Bromwich’s theory of belief over 
the Humean theory of belief, contrary to what Bromwich claims. 
 
7. Vacuity 
Recall that for Bromwich, David says yes to Carole’s question because he believes that the 
knives and forks are on the table, i.e., he is disposed to act as if it is the case that the knives 
and forks are on the table. The belief is motivationally efficacious, so it by itself can generate 
the action of answering the question. In consequence, the desire to answer the question 
honestly is not needed to explain why David answers it affirmatively. Notice that in 
Bromwich’s explanation of David’s verbal behavior, the explanans is the disposition to 
answer affirmatively, and the explanandum is the act of answering affirmatively. Thus, her 
explanation has the form: An agent does X because he is disposed to do X. 
A problem with Bromwich’s explanatory scheme is that any action can be explained in 
that manner. For instance, David is sleeping now because he is disposed to sleep. The glasses 
break into pieces because they are disposed to break into pieces. These explanations are 
almost vacuous, casting no interesting light on why the phenomena occurred. Likewise, 
Bromwich’s explanation is also almost vacuous that David answers Carole’s question 
affirmatively because he is disposed to speak as if it is the case that the knives and forks are 
on the table. It does not shed new light on why David answers in an affirmative manner. Such 
an explanation verges on triviality.  
 
8. Third Factor 
There is another problem with Bromwich’s contention that “the belief alone explains the 
action” (2010: 352). In general, a disposition cannot generate an action alone. A third factor is 
needed for the disposition to bring about the action. For example, in addition to being 
disposed to break into pieces, the glasses need to be dropped to the ground from a high place 
in order to break into pieces. The disposition of the glasses alone cannot generate the event of 
the glasses’ breaking into pieces. Similarly, being disposed to answer a question honestly 
alone cannot generate the action of answering a question honestly, i.e., a belief alone cannot 
generate an action, so the belief alone cannot explain the action. Hence, the explanation of an 
action invoking only a belief is incomplete.  
Bromwich might reply that an agent answers a question honestly because his belief 
disposed him to do so, and he was asked the question. Being asked the question is the third 
factor that contributed to the generation of the answering act. A problem with this move is 
that it is saddled with the assumption that being asked the question does not cause a mental 
state which in turn activates the disposition of the belief. Once Bromwich invokes the mental 
state, she has to give up her previous contention that a belief alone is enough to motivate an 
action, and she opens the door to the Humean view that a desire needs to be invoked in 
addition to a belief to explain an action.  
 
9. Independence 
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In this section, I argue that the disposition to answer honestly is separate from belief. 
Consider that we are genetically disposed to feel that snakes are repulsive. We have the 
standing disposition to shy away from a snake, although we have never seen one before. The 
disposition is manifested when we see a snake. Thus, the disposition stemmed not from the 
belief but from our genes. An evolutionary story can be given of why we have the innate 
disposition to stay away from a snake. Our ancestors acquired the disposition after a series of 
variations in the distant past. The disposition was advantageous for their survival and 
reproduction, especially in forests. Given that some snakes were poisonous, individuals with 
the disposition were more likely to enjoy longevity and fecundity than those without. 
Eventually, the disposition became genetically encoded in our ancestors. As a result, it is 
innate in us now. The innate disposition is defeasible. It can be obstructed by a stronger 
opposing motive in a particular situation. For example, we may not step back from a snake, 
once we are told that the snake is not poisonous and that we will be given a million dollars 
provided that we do not step back. 
Analogously, we are genetically wired to answer honestly when we are asked questions. 
An evolutionary explanation can also be given of why we have this innate disposition. Our 
ancestors acquired the disposition due to a series of variations in the distant past. It raised the 
viability and fertility of our ancestors. Imagine a society where individuals have the default 
disposition to answer honestly and another society where individuals have the default 
disposition not to answer at all or to answer dishonestly. It is clear that the first society has 
the better chance to perpetuate itself than the second. After all, where there is no honest 
exchange of information, there is no cooperation and, hence, no prosperity. In short, the genes 
responsible for the default disposition enhanced the fitness of our ancestors, and we inherited 
the innate disposition from our ancestors. The innate disposition exists temporally prior to, 
hence independently of, any belief that we acquire after we are born. Like the disposition to 
step back from a snake, the disposition to answer honestly is defeasible. It can be overridden 
by a more forceful, opposite reason in a particular situation. For example, we may not answer 
a question as we believe if we are angry at our questioner. In any event, the disposition to 
answer honestly is extrinsic to any belief we form after we are born, pace Bromwich. 
The foregoing evolutionary story suggests that dispositions in general originate by and 
large from genes, whereas beliefs originate by and large from the environment. Let me 
bolster this idea with the following considerations. First, it is a fact of our daily life that 
different people exhibit different behavioral dispositions but converge on the same belief, 
when they are exposed to the same stimulus. For example, David and Carole see a beautiful 
woman on the street. They have the same belief that a beautiful woman is in front of them, 
but they have different dispositions: David is disposed to flirt with her, while Carole is 
disposed to guard against her. They have these different dispositions because they have 
different genetic properties.  
Second, we may have different dispositions, but we typically possess the same belief at 
different stages of our life. For instance, when children and adults are listening to a fairy tale, 
they have the same belief that they are listening to the fairy tale, but they have different 
dispositions. The children are disposed to continue to listen to it, but the adults are disposed 
to do something else, e.g., reproducing. Why do they have different dispositions? Genes 
programmed human beings to have different dispositions at different stages of life. 
Consequentially, children have a predilection for fairy tales, and adults for reproduction-
related activities. Thus, what we are disposed to do is largely determined by our genes, 
whereas what we believe is largely determined by stimuli from the environment.  
Third, dispositions are hereditary traits that can be passed from one generation to the 
9 
 
next, but beliefs are not. My father has the cognitive disposition to make an inference from 
one belief to another and the phenomenal disposition to be surprised when his belief is 
disconfirmed. I inherited those dispositions from him. In contrast, he believes that his mother 
was great, but I do not. He and I have similar dispositions, because we are genetically similar, 
but we have different beliefs, because we were exposed to different stimuli. Thus, genes are 
largely responsible for dispositions, whereas stimuli are largely responsible for beliefs. It 
follows that if you want to know what others are disposed to do, it is useful to investigate 
what their parents were disposed to do. In contrast, if you want to know what others believe, 
it is useful to investigate what stimuli they were exposed to. 
Finally, the Humean theory of belief can neatly account for our belief-forming 
processes, but Bromwich’s theory of belief cannot. Bromwich’s theory holds that the 
disposition to answer honestly is inherent in a belief. Thus, the content of the belief that the 
earth is round embeds the dispositional content “Reply affirmatively to the question: Is it the 
case that the earth is round?” This suggestion, however, does not match up with what goes on 
in science classes. No teacher says to his students “The earth is round. Answer affirmatively 
to the question: Is it the case that the earth is round?” in order to help his students to form the 
belief that the earth is round. Teachers only say to their students that “The earth is round.” 
The Humean explanation of what goes on in the science classes is that students have the 
innate disposition to answer honestly, so it is superfluous to add “Answer affirmatively to the 
question: Is it the case that the earth is round?” 
 
10. Conclusion 
What we are disposed to do is largely determined by our genes, whereas what we believe is 
largely determined by stimuli from the environment. The standing disposition to answer 
questions honestly ceteris paribus is innate like other dispositions, such as the behavioral 
disposition to shy away from a snake, the cognitive disposition to make inferences, and the 
phenomenal disposition to be surprised. We genetically inherited these dispositions from our 
ancestors. In contrast, we acquire beliefs from the environment, and we cannot genetically 
convey beliefs to future generations. Since dispositions and beliefs have different origins and 
incompatible properties, they are separate mental properties, contrary to what many 
philosophers assert in the meta-ethics literature. Besides, the neural findings pertaining to the 
rat’s brain support the Humean view that motivation is extrinsic to belief.  
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